University Tips

A discourse on Iraq

By Ajarn Helen Jandamit
Photographs courtesy of AP

Until quite recently, most of the news supplied by the mainstream news agencies tended to support the policies and statements of the US Republican Party and especially President George Bush.

However, this editorial from the New York Times News Service, which was reprinted in the Perspective section of the Bangkok Post on October 10, 2004, questions President Bush�s justification for invading Iraq.

This editorial has been chosen as the subject of the University Tips column this week not only because of its thought-provoking content, but also because it is a good example of the way a piece of writing can be structured. That structure leads the reader along a certain line of thought and convinces him that there is merit in the argument that is being presented. The technical term for organising ideas in such a way is �discourse.�

You do not need to agree with the ideas presented in this editorial, but please take note of how they are presented. Each idea leads logically to the next and the momentum builds up to a climax. Since the vocabulary used is fairly advanced, check the definitions given before you read the story.

DISCOURSE

In linguistics, discourse is the use of language in speech and writing in order to produce meaning. It also refers to language that is studied, usually to see how different parts of a text are connected.

WorldVIEWS

The nuclear bomb that wasn�t

US president George W. Bush.

President Bush's national security adviser, Condeleezza Rice.

Of all the justifications that President Bush gave for invading Iraq, the most terrifying was that Saddam Hussein was on the brink of developing a nuclear bomb that he might use against the US or give to terrorists. Ever since we learned that this was not true, the question has been whether Bush gave a good-faith account of the best available intelligence or knowingly deceived the public.

The more we learn about the way Bush paved the way to war, the more it becomes disturbingly clear that if he was not aware that he was feeding misinformation to the world, he was about the only one in his circle who had not been clued in.

The foundation for the administration�s claim that it acted on an honest assessment of intelligence analysis � and that the president�s frequent claim that congress had the same information he had � has been steadily eroded by the reports from the Senate Intelligence Committee and the 9/11 commission. A lengthy report in the Times on Sunday removed any lingering doubts.

The only physical evidence the administration offered of an Iraqi nuclear programme were the 60,000 aluminium tubes that Baghdad set out to buy in early 2001; some of them were seized in Jordan. Even though Iraq had a history of using the same tubes to make small rockets, the president and his closest advisers told the American people that the overwhelming consensus of government experts was that these new tubes were to be used to make nuclear bomb fuel. Now we know there was no such consensus. Bush�s closest advisers say they didn�t know that until after they had made the case for war. But in fact, they had plenty of evidence that the claim was baseless; it was a long-discounted theory that had to be resurrected from the intelligence community�s wastebasket when the administration needed justification for invading Iraq.

The tubes for bombs theory was the creation of a low-level CIA analyst who got his facts wrong, even the size of the tubes. It was refuted within 24 hours by the Energy Department, which issued three papers debunking the idea over a four-month period in 2001, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. A week before Bush�s 2003 State of the Union address, in which he warned of an Iraqi nuclear menace, international experts in Vienna, Austria, had dismissed the CIA�s theory about the tubes. The day before, the International Atomic Energy Agency said there was no evidence of an Iraqi nuclear programme and rejected the tubes� tale entirely.

It is shocking that with all this information readily available, Secretary of State Colin Powell still went before the United Nations to repeat the bogus claims, an appearance that gravely damaged his reputation. It�s even more disturbing that Vice President Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, had not only failed to keep the president from misleading the American people, but had also become the chief proponents of the �mushroom cloud� rhetoric.

Rice had access to all the reports, debunking the tubes theory when she first talked about it publicly in September 2002. Yet last Sunday, Rice said that while she had been aware of a �dispute� about the tubes, she had not specifically known what it was about until after she had told the world that Saddam was building the bomb.

Rice�s spokesman, Sean McCormack, said it was not her job to question intelligence reports or to �referee disputes in the Intelligence community.�

But even with that curious job disclaimer, it�s no comfort to think that the national security adviser wouldn�t have bothered to inform herself about such a major issue before speaking publicly. The national security adviser has no more important responsibility than making sure that the president gets the best advice on life-and-death issues like the war.

If Rice did her job and told Bush how ludicrous the case was for an Iraqi nuclear programme, then Bush terribly misled the public. If not, she should have resigned for allowing her boss to start a war on the basis of bad information and an incomplete analysis. � NYT News Service

(Bangkok Post, Perspective, October 10, 2004)

Question 1. Look at paragraph 5 and then arrange the following seven points to show how they relate to each other in real time. What really happened and in what order? Put the first (i.e. the earliest) at the top of your list, with the most recent at the end.

A: The Energy Department issued three papers over a four-month period in 2001 showing that the CIA analyst got his facts wrong and the International Atomic Energy Agency also proved that the CIA analyst�s theory was false.

B: A low-level CIA analyst got his facts wrong and he did not know the actual size of the aluminium tubes.

C: The next day President Bush, in his State of the Union address, warned of an Iraqi nuclear threat.

D: The International Atomic Energy Agency completely rejected the CIA �tubes for bombs� theory.

E: Within 24 hours, the Energy Department proved that the information about the tubes was wrong.

F: The International Atomic Energy Agency said there was no evidence of an Iraqi nuclear programme.

G: International experts in Vienna, Austria, dismissed the CIA�s theory about the tubes.

Can you see how the information given here in the form of verifiable facts leads you to draw conclusions already? Let�s look now at paragraph 6. This paragraph mentions members of the administration. Fill in their names next to their positions.

2. Secretary of State ...................................

3. Vice President ...........................................

4. National Security Adviser .................. According to the story, who did the following?

5. ............................................. repeated false claims to the United Nations.

6. ............................................. failed to keep the president from misleading the American people.

7. ............................................. supported the idea that Iraq was a potential threat.

The writer has now moved attention from President Bush to three important members of his administration.

8. Who are the final paragraphs mainly concerned with?

a. Colin Powell.
b. Sean McCormack.
c. George W. Bush.
d. Condoleezza Rice.

9. According to paragraphs 7 and 8, had Condoleezza Rice been given the reports showing that the CIA�s tube theory was false before she told the world that Saddam Hussein was building a nuclear bomb? (Yes or No.)

10. How did her spokesman counter attacks on Rice�s performance about the tubes theory?

a. He said that her duties did not include asking for verification of Intelligence reports.
b. He said that it was not the job of the national security adviser to control and judge disputes related to Intelligence.
c. Both of the above.
d. Neither of the above.

11. How does the writer of the editorial react to the spokesman�s words?

a. He finds them amusing.
b. He finds them odd.
c. He finds them ludicrous.
d. He thinks they are convincing.

12. What does the writer consider to be the most important responsibility of the national security adviser?

a. To inform herself about major issues before speaking publicly.
b. To check Intelligence reports.
c. To give the president the best advice on life-and-death issues.
d. To be aware of disputes in the Intelligence community.

The writer then gives two possible scenarios for what happened before the US invaded Iraq.

1: Condoleezza Rice told President Bush that the arguments given to prove a nuclear programme in Iraq were not supported by factual evidence.

2: Condoleezza Rice knew that there was no factual evidence to show that there was a nuclear programme in Iraq but she did not tell President Bush.

13. According to the editorial, which of the following leads on from scenario 1 and which from scenario 2?

a. Bush misled the public.
b. Condoleezza Rice should resign because she allowed her boss to start a war based on bad information.

Vocabulary

justification (n): a good reason why something exists or is done
account (n): a written or spoken description of something that has happened
intelligence (n): secret information that is collected about a foreign country
assessment (n): an opinion or judgement about something or somebody that has been thought about very carefully
erode (v): to gradually destroy something or to make it weaker over a period of time
the senate (n): one of two groups of elected politicians who make laws in some countries
commission (n): an official group of people who have been given responsibility to control something, or find out about something, usually for the government
lengthy (adj): very long and often too long, in time and in size
consensus (n): an opinion that all members of a group agree with
baseless (adj): not supported by good reasons or facts
resurrect (v): to bring back into use something, such as a belief, a practice, etc. that has disappeared or been forgotten
refute (v): to prove that something is wrong
debunk (v): to show that an idea, belief, etc. is false; to show that something is not as good as people think
menace (n): a person or thing that will probably cause serious damage, harm or danger
to go before (a judge, etc.) (phrasal v): to be presented to somebody or something, for discussion, decision or judgement
proponent (n): a person who supports and idea or course of action
mushroom cloud (adj): relating to a large cloud, shaped like a mushroom, which forms in the air after a nuclear explosion
rhetoric (n): speech or writing that is intended to influence people, but that is not completely honest or sincere
referee (v): to act as a referee in a game (or debate, etc.)
disclaimer (n): a statement in which somebody says that he or she is not connected with or responsible for something
bother (to do something) (phrasal v): to spend time and/or energy doing something
ludicrous (adj): ridiculous and unreasonable: that you cannot take seriously
mislead (v): to give someone the wrong idea or impression and make him believe something that is not true

Idioms

to be on the brink of something: to be at the beginning of something very new, dangerous or exciting to be clued in to something: to have the most recent information about something
in good faith: believing what you are doing is right or correct
to pave the road to/way for something: to create a situation in which somebody will be able to do something